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Abstract
The suitability of Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is being challenged in dynamic environments like healthcare.
In an RBAC system, a user’s legitimate access may be denied if their need has not been anticipated by the security
administrator at the time of policy specification. Alternatively, even when the policy is correctly specified an autho-
rised user may accidentally or intentionally misuse the granted permission. The heart of the challenge is the intrinsic
unpredictability of users’ operational needs as well as their incentives to misuse permissions. In this paper we propose
a novel Budget-aware Role Based Access Control (B-RBAC) model that extends RBAC with the explicit notion of
budget and cost, where users are assigned a limited budget through which they pay for the cost of permissions they
need. We propose a model where the value of resources are explicitly defined and an RBAC policy is used as a refer-
ence point to discriminate the price of access permissions, as opposed to representing hard and fast rules for making
access decisions. This approach has several desirable properties. It enables users to acquire unassigned permissions
if they deem them necessary. However, users misuse capability is always bounded by their allocated budget and is
further adjustable through the discrimination of permission prices. Finally, it provides a uniform mechanism for the
detection and prevention of misuses.
Keywords: Role based access control, insider threat, misaligned incentives, information asymmetry, price
discrimination.
1. Introduction
Access control is challenging in an organisational set-
ting because on one hand employees need enough ac-
cess to perform their jobs, while on the other hand more
access will bring about an increasing risk of misuse - ei-
ther intentionally, where an employee uses the access
for personal benefit, or unintentionally through care-
lessness, losing the information or being socially engi-
neered to give access to an adversary [2, 3, 4]. The ulti-
mate goal and responsibility of a security administrator
is to allocate each employee the precise level of access
required for their job - no more and no less [2, 5]. If this
goal is met the allocation can be said to be optimal.
At the core of existing access control approaches such
as Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [6] lies the im-
plicit assumption that the optimal security policy that
IThis paper is an extended version of our paper titled ”An ap-
proach to access control under uncertainty” [1].
assigns permission to users can be constructed a priori
and maintained correctly, i.e., by a security administra-
tor. However, the process of access control in dynamic
environments such as healthcare exhibits three charac-
teristics that challenge the practicality of this fundamen-
tal assumption. First, usually there is information asym-
metry between the administrator and the employees. Job
functions (tasks) within an organisation are performed
by employees who, due to the dynamic nature of the
work, have special information concerning their partic-
ular sphere of activity. Often, this information is not
available to administrators (or even supervisors) to pre-
cisely determine what permissions employees may need
to complete their tasks. Even if the information is avail-
able, maintaining the correctness of the security pol-
icy is challenging and resource intensive due to the dy-
namism that exists in organisations [7, 5]. As a result
any security policy is at best an approximation of true
access requirements. Second, employees are generally
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self-interested individuals [8, 9]. The optimality of the
policy depends not only on whether an employee needs
the permission to perform a task, but also on whether
the employee decides to use the permission for per-
forming the task. There may be divergence of prefer-
ences between the action an employee considers opti-
mal and that which is optimal for the organisation. This
divergence arises because employees may also seek to
maximize their own self-interest. This becomes partic-
ularly problematic when employees draw personal ben-
efit from misusing permissions. Third, perfect audit, or
verification of employees’ usage of permissions, is pro-
hibitively costly [10]. This is primarily due to the non-
rivalrous property of digital resources (i.e., a resource
can be used by more than one employee or for more
than one purpose simultaneously), and the plethora of
applications that allow employees to make use of these
resources. In many cases, the misuse of permissions
can go undetected for long periods. For instance, a re-
cent Verizon data breach investigations report found that
more than 70% of data breaches (within organisations in
the study) are only detected weeks after their occurrence
[4, p. 55]. In addition to the above common character-
istics, access control in healthcare must satisfy another
unique and challenging requirement: “nothing must in-
terfere with the delivery of care” [5, 11]. Hence, an ac-
cess request may not be simply denied because it is not
explicitly authorised by a predefined policy.1
In the face of these characteristics, any access deci-
sion based on a static security policy that binds access
rights to users on the basis of predefined operational
needs and assumed unlikelihood of misuse is doomed to
be ineffective [7, 12, 13]. This contention is supported
by the results of several studies [5, 14, 15], including an
empirical study of database access logs of eight Norwe-
gian hospitals by Røstad et al., [10, 11] which suggests
that classical RBAC is unduly restrictive for healthcare.
Røstad et al. report that clinicians’ use of an exception
handling mechanism that can override access requests
denied by the static RBAC policy (i.e., if staff decide
such information is necessary) is widespread. Indeed,
they found that 17% of all record accesses occurred
through the exception mechanism. Although introduc-
ing exceptions enhances flexibility, use of exceptions
must be regularly audited to ensure they are not mis-
used. However, due to the dynamic nature of healthcare
and the static nature of the policy, it turns out that the
use of exceptions is hardly an exception (i.e., 74% of
the staff were assigned the permission to override de-
1Technically, this means the existing default rule of “deny - if in
doubt” is no longer acceptable.
nied access requests and 54% of active health records
accessed in a one month period had been accessed as an
exception [10]). They report, the sheer number of ac-
cesses via exception has made monitoring and misuse
detection/prevention an impractical task. As a result,
those staff who either maliciously or inadvertently mis-
use their access rights are unlikely to be held account-
able [16, 17].
This paper is motivated by the shortcomings of
RBAC when information asymmetry is present. More
precisely, we consider settings where operational needs
and a user’s incentives to misuse resources are only par-
tially known by the administrator while constructing an
RBAC policy. We propose a novel approach to access
control by adopting an existing RBAC policy as a refer-
ence point to discriminate the price of permissions for
users, rather than using it as the only base for making an
authorisation decision. Through this, those users who
based on an existing RBAC policy possess a permission
would pay a base price for a permission, while others
pay an elevated price. In order to pay for access, users
are given a limited budget, allocated according to the
administrator’s current knowledge of each user’s opera-
tional needs. However, as users interact with the system
their budget may be reduced according to the informa-
tion available about their type, i.e., their propensity to
misuse their budget.
In this paper we will propose a novel Budget-aware
Role Based Access Control model (B-RBAC) and show
that it can improve RBAC in four major aspects. First,
it makes possible the specification of an upper-bound
on the damage any employee may inflict in any pe-
riod. For example, regardless of the number of database
records a role potentially has access to via its assigned
permissions, only as many records can be accessed as
they have budget for. The proposal can therefore pre-
vent a large scale ‘record dump’. Second, the model
directly promotes employee accountability and takes a
step towards the alignment of employees’ preferences
such that they choose to observe the principle of least
privilege. For instance, given two alternative mediums
to access a record, secure that is cheap and insecure that
is more expensive, employees with limited budget have
incentives to use the cheaper option to preserve their
budget and consequently they choose to use a more se-
cure alternative. Third, the model enables employees to
gain permissions that have not been preassigned to them
(i.e., due to the incomplete knowledge of the RBAC ad-
ministrator). This feature is particularly important for
access control in environments such as healthcare where
the inability or untimely access to resources may have
profound consequences. Fourth, the model allows for
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a uniform misuse detection and prevention mechanism,
through monitoring users’ budget spending. Where ad-
ministrator’s resource to audit is constrained, they can
focus primarily on accesses with high price multiplier
or verify the access usage of employees whose budget
is exhausted.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2 we provide an account of the related works.
Section 3 formally introduces our Budget-aware Role
Based Access Control (B-RBAC) model. The notion of
value (cost) of permissions and its implications on stan-
dard RBAC is defined in Section 3.1. The implication
of explicit specification of the cost of tasks in quanti-
fying a role’s weight is introduced in Section 3.2. It is
shown in Section 3.3 how by using a role’s weight as the
multiplier for access cost we can influence users to acti-
vate less powerful roles and adhere to the least privilege
principle. Section 3.4 defines the concept of escalation,
through which users can acquire unassigned permis-
sions. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 respectively introduce two
mechanisms, namely access discrimination and budget
allocation that together ensure: 1) the upper-bound cost
each user may incur is explicitly accounted for, 2) the
cost of access is determined in part by their job function,
and 3) a user’s budget is parameterised by the history
of outcomes of their prior choices (i.e., misuses). Sec-
tion 4 provides an account of the security implications
of the proposed model including the attacks that can
be detected/prevented. Section 5 examines implemen-
tation considerations for the proposed B-RBAC model
and proposes four core sub-models that vary in terms of
their overhead on administrators and users. Finally, we
will discuss future directions in Section 6 and conclude
with Section 7.
2. Related Works
The optimal allocation of access permissions proves
to be a complex task in practice. In [18], Zhao et al. em-
ployed the empirical results from [5], the study of access
control in financial institutions, to provide an intriguing
discussion of these complexities. They coined the terms
over-entitlement and under-entitlement, respectively re-
ferring to the employees’ acquisition of more or less
permissions than they actually require to perform their
tasks. The authors suggested that an information gover-
nance approach is required, which provides incentives
such that employees’ self-interested behaviour can re-
sult in a firm’s optimal use of information. Their re-
cent formalisation [19] is directly inspired by theoreti-
cal techniques to address the principal-agent problem in
the field of economics. Despite our interest in the gen-
eral direction of such a solution, their model is abstract
and does not directly relate to any of the existing access
control models. They also make some assumptions that
may be difficult to address in practice. Similar to the
game theoretic access control model proposed by Salim
et al. [20], they assume it is possible to quantify the ben-
efit of opportunities that can be seized by allowing em-
ployees to escalate (increase) their access permissions.
The risk-based approach to access control has
emerged recently to address the under-entitlement prob-
lem flagged by the JASON report [7]. Cheng et al. [13]
proposed a Risk-Adaptive Access Control (QRAAC)
based on Bell-LaPadulla’s Multilevel Security model
(MLS) [21]. They introduce a flexible gap between al-
low and deny, where transactions that are denied in the
MLS model may be allowed using some additional risk
mitigation mechanisms. Following the JASON report,
they adopt the notion of risk tokens which can be traded
for extra permissions. A shortcoming of their approach
lies in their basing the allocation of risk tokens on a sub-
ject’s clearance level - the higher the clearance level, the
more risk tokens they receive. A problem arises when a
high clearance individual decides to misuse such privi-
leges. With a large allocation they can do considerable
(though bounded) damage. Also, their model is not con-
cerned with over-entitlement, to address the users mis-
use of preassigned permissions. Furthermore, their for-
mal framework is based on MLS, where objects are cat-
egorised based on their sensitivity level. However, in
models such as RBAC this categorisation is unavailable.
Not withstanding these limitations they have proposed a
novel approach.
Liu et al. [22, 23] proposed a model to address the
over-entitlement problem by assigning a risk budget for
jobs and rewarding those employees who perform their
tasks while consuming less than the allocated budget
and punishing those who exhaust their budget before
completing their tasks. In this way, the risk is com-
municated to the user and the cost of risky actions is
shifted from the organisation to them. While their pro-
posal is related to ours, it is not concerned with RBAC
model. Furthermore, in their proposal users are only
charged against their risk budgets when their access is
considered to be an escalation. Hence, users’ misuse of
their already assigned permissions cannot be accounted
for. Finally, reward and punishment are external to the
model, applied ex post and are assumed to be influenc-
ing users misuse decisions.
Several models have also been proposed to improve
the flexibility of the RBAC model. Motivated by the
suitability of trust management concepts for access con-
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trol in distributed systems, Dimmock et al. [24] intro-
duced the notion of trust to RBAC such that access deci-
sions take into account users’ trustworthiness metric in
addition to their roles. While this approach is more fine
grained than making access decisions based on roles
alone, the users’ trust level is still static and predefined.
Furthermore, the access decision is still based on a pre-
defined trust threshold and no escalation capability is
defined.
Nissanke and Khayat [25] introduced a formal risk
ordering relation between pairs of tasks that belong to
different roles. Their model considers the relative risk
associated with situations when users belonging to dif-
ferent roles perform a similar task. Through this, del-
egation of permissions from one role to another is pa-
rameterised by the associated risk. However, the pri-
mary shortcoming of their approach, which also forms
part of the motivation for our work is that their notion
of risk is still static and assumed to be driven from the
difference between roles. It ignores the risk that arises
from the human users, associated to these roles. Fur-
thermore, the users in their model can only perform the
tasks that are pre-assigned to them either through direct
assignment or delegation, hence there is no concept of
escalation to address under-entitlement.
Celikel et al. [16] also proposed a risk-based ap-
proach to RBAC in the context of relational database
management systems. Their work is mainly concerned
with the risk of role misuse, defined as repetitive query
submission, i.e., query flooding. They introduce the no-
tion of occurrence rating that binds the probability of a
misuse to the number of times a query has been sub-
mitted by the user. However, the proposed approach
only focuses on the over-entitlement problem and the
notion of misuse is limited in this definition. Further-
more, their model is not concerned with addressing
under-entitlement or providing incentives to influence
the users to make misuse (sending repetitive queries)
unattractive.
Yemini et al., [17, 26] proposed MarketNet, a net-
work architecture that uses financial instruments to reg-
ulate the use of shared network resources such as stor-
age and processing power. The framework allows each
network domain to control access and direct traffic to
their shared resources through setting an access price for
each resource. Their work is conceptually close to the
B-RBAC model proposed in this paper, however they
require each node in the network to generate its own
budget through providing access to its shared resources,
a requirement that is impractical for access control in
an organisation setting. More importantly, there is no
direct mapping between their proposal and any existing
access control model, e.g., RBAC.
3. B-RBAC Model
The problem that we address in this paper is how an
administrator of an RBAC system can allocate a task
(i.e., unassigned permissions) to a user when the un-
desirable consequences of the execution of the task is
contingent upon the ex ante unknown type of the user.
Intuitively, binding the consequence to an unknown pa-
rameter (type) introduces the uncertainty that exists in
access control due to unpredictability about future user
behaviour. For the rest of this paper we consider the no-
tion of type to embody any private information affecting
users’ preferences over how to use the permissions. We
assume the type space of users to be a spectrum from
benevolent to malicious, where allocating a task to a
benevolent (malicious) user will have the least (worst)
undesirable consequence.
The rest of this section provides a formal approach
to define and annotate the notion of undesirable conse-
quence to tasks, and elucidates the implication of such
explicit specification on the core RBAC model.
3.1. Task Consequences
Following standard RBAC terminology [27], the set
of resources that are subject to access control is referred
to by O, the set of actions that can be performed on ob-
jects by A. The set of all possible actions on objects
is referred to as tasks, T = A × O, and the set of all
users by U. Let the set of all possible undesirable con-
sequences of tasks to be exhaustive and incompatible
(i.e., C = ∑ni=1 ci) and let there be a total order  on
C. We write ci  c j to mean that the consequence ci is
costlier than c j. Given this, we assume that there exists
a mapping function that assigns a cost value to the con-
sequences, i.e., that is the level of “badness”. Since this
valuation is organisation dependant, we introduce and
use an organisation specific currency represented by [
when referring to the cost of a consequence.2
cost : C → R+ s.t.
cost[ci] > cost[cj]⇐⇒ ci  c j, ∀i, j. (1)
Let the users’ type space to be Θ = {0, ..., 1}. We say
that a user is benevolent when θ ∈ Θ = 0 and malicious
2There may be a direct mapping between the organisation specific
cost ([) of an undesirable consequence and the actual cost, the dollar
value $. However, this may not always be the case. For example,
in a hospital case, the undesirable consequence of not being able to
provide care (e.g., due to under-entitlement) may not be quantified by
a dollar value.
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when θ ∈ Θ = 1.3 Given a type space Θ, the possible
undesirable consequences of a task are contingent upon
the type of the user - capturing the dependency of the
consequences on how the permission is misused. For-
mally, the relation between task, type and consequences
is defined as:
f : T × Θ→ C. (2)
Hence, since a combination of a task t ∈ T and a type
θ ∈ Θ will produce a particular consequence c ∈ C (i.e.,
[t, θ] → c = f [t, θ]), for each task there exists a sub-
set of undesirable consequences based on the possible
types of users that can misuse the task (eq. 2). Further,
since any subset of C has a maximum cost (eq. 1), it
naturally follows that for any task a maximum cost can
be determined. Formally, we write as max
C
[t] (read, the
maximum cost of t):
max
C
: T→ R+ s.t.
max
C
[t] = ci ⇐⇒ @ f [t, θ] = c j
where ci < c j,∀θ ∈ Θ.
(3)
The process of quantifying the maximum cost of an
operation on those resources that have intrinsic value is
intuitive. For instance, if we are designing an access
control system to utilise access to a resource such as a
printer, the cost of a task “print a document” can be de-
fined as: the unit cost of print per page (e.g., [0.1), times
the number of pages in the document. In controlling
access to limited resources such as network bandwidth
where quality of service is important, the cost of access
may be driven from the marginal cost of the facility as
well as an extra premium for the cost imposed on others
using the crowded network [28].
The explicit quantification of the maximum cost of
an operation on information resources that do not have
an intrinsic value can also be determined by the same
logic, even though it may be less intuitive. The value of
these resources depends on the potential cost of misuse,
for example the cost to reconstruct lost data, restore the
integrity of the fabricated or intercepted data or pay the
functional liabilities for public disclosure of confidential
or private data [13, 7].
To clarify how the actual cost of such tasks is de-
termined consider the example illustrated in Figure 1a.
3Note that the actual type space is application dependant. It cap-
tures the possible relevant misuse actions - the ones that the organi-
sation may be concerned about their undesirable consequences, e.g.,
corrupting the record, publicizing private information, etc. In this
sense a user’s type is an abstraction of the potential harm they can
cause by misusing their permissions.
Let Alice be an administrator in a hospital, managing
a database of patients’ records. Further assume two
query that can be executed against this database, Fur-
ther consider two sample queries that can be executed
against this database by hospital staff, t1: access up to
ten rows, t2: access a table (of up to 100 rows). For
now assume that Alice is only concerned about poten-
tial privacy breaches that would incur a cost of [2 per
record (i.e., the fine specified by data breach laws). Al-
ice knows that a staff member can be either benevolent
or malicious, Θ = {benevolent,malicious}where benev-
olent does not breach the privacy policy but the mali-
cious does. Hence, the universal set of consequences
would be C = [0, ..., 200]. Clearly the potential conse-
quences of each task are as follows: t1 = [0, . . . , 20]
and t2 = [0, . . . , 200]. Hence, maxC
[t1] = [20 and
max
C
[t2] = [200.
There is no restriction on the granularity of cost as-
signment. The granularity of associating cost to tasks
is directly dependant on how much information the ad-
ministrator has about the resources that are being gov-
erned. One can envisage a more comprehensive set of
rules, where given a matrix of records Di,j and an action,
a cost matrix Ci, j is produced such that each cell has a
unique cost.
The explicit assignment of (maximum) cost to tasks,
even though an approximate measure, has two impor-
tant advantages. It quantifies the potential upper-bound
cost that the misuse of any task may incur. More im-
portantly, it provides a basis for a relative comparison
of tasks. Formally, we can extend the relation  to also
be applied on the set T:
t  t′ ⇐⇒ max
C
[t] > max
C
[t′] ∀t, t′ ∈ T. (4)
As illustrated in Figure 1a, given eq. 4 and the above
example, we can deduce that t2  t1 (the maximum cost
of t2 is greater than t1). To elucidate the implications
of the above exposition let us apply it to the standard
RBAC model. In RBAC users can be either unautho-
rised or authorised (Θ = {0, 1}), since the notion of
consequence is not expressible within the model, access
decisions are based on the types of users, rather than on
consequences of tasks in question. This would inher-
ently mean that consequences are binary as well, impli-
cating acceptable or unacceptable cost (C = {0, 1}). As
Figure 1a illustrates such a binary representation cannot
express the distinction between tasks in any unautho-
rised or authorised state. The cost of t1, t2 used by an
unauthorised user is indistinguishable.
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Figure 2: Rol scalation.
For example, let us assume Bob is an intern at the
hospital with no authorisation to access a patient’s ad-
diction history, explicitly neither to read on the screen
(t1) nor to print (t2). An emergency arises and Bob must
access one of the patient’s records. Obviously, provid-
ing an exceptional access to execute a task that limits a
potential misuse opportunity (t1) is preferable. This is
what is referred to as most-tolerable-privilege in [29].
As shown in Figure 1b, such a distinction can be made
when the upper-bound cost of tasks is explicit.
3.2. Role Weight
A role is a logical grouping of tasks, required for per-
forming a particular job function. The set of all roles is
denoted byR and the set of all predefined task-role asso-
ciations is referred to as permissions: P ⊆ T × R. Since
roles may differ both in terms of the quantity and the
quality of their tasks (i.e., the extent of undesirable con-
sequences if a task is misused), the designers of RBAC
suggested in [6, p. 5] that “powerful roles can be kept
dormant until they are needed, to provide an element of
least privilege and safety”. However, the authors only
informally state the concept of a role’s power (hereafter,
weight), as the RBAC model does not allow it to be for-
mally defined.
This notion is naturally captured when tasks are ex-
plicitly annotated with their maximum cost (eq. 3) - a
role’s weight corresponds to the cost of its associated
tasks.4 There are however several options available to
compute a role’s weight. Here we use arithmetic sum-
mation over the cost of the role’s tasks.5 This guarantees
the cost of a role is at least equal to its most costly task
while also reflecting the cheaper tasks that are associ-
ated with the role. Figure ?? illustrates role’s cost as the
aggregate cost of the tasks assigned to them (permis-
sions). It can be seen that taking the weight of a role to
be the cost of its most costly task would provide an in-
accurate picture by implying that roles r2 and r3 to have
equal weight. Formally,
max
W
[r] =
∑
∀t∈T|(t,r)∈P
max
C
[t]. (5)
An explicit quantification of a role’s weight can be
used to provide a notion of priority for administrative
functions such as role activity monitoring and audit.
More importantly however, a role’s weight can also be
utilised to construct a disincentive for users, directing
them to perform their tasks through cheaper roles when-
ever possible. Note that, this was one of the motivations
for introducing the concept of sessions in RBAC, which
enable users to activate only those roles necessary to
complete their jobs [6]. However, enforcement of such a
4It is important to mention that a task’s cost and a role’s weight do
not directly represent risk, that by definition is composed of likelihood
and consequence. Here cost and weight are indications of potential
maximum consequence and do not capture the likelihood, which will
be taken into account in the following section
5Another alternative is to take the cost of the most costly task of the
role. This is similar to our approach in determining the cost of tasks.
However, it undermines the distinction between tasks and roles: tasks
have mutually exclusive consequences, while roles may be composed
of many tasks inducing a union of their consequences.
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practice is not trivial because only the user at the time of
performing a job can determine exactly what roles they
may need in a session to complete the job. Hence, so
far this desire could not be enforced in RBAC as users
did not have anything at stake if they simply chose to
activate a session where all their roles were active in it.
The following section will show how the weight of a
role can be used to adjust the price of permissions and
facilitate the enforcement of this practice.
3.3. Price of Permission
In RBAC, users are assigned to roles (UA ⊆ U × R),
and they are only authorised to execute the tasks of
those roles that the administrator has already assigned
to them:
execute[t, r]→ ∃(t, r) ∈ P ∧ ∃(u, r) ∈ UA. (6)
Since user-role and role-task relationships are many
to many, a user may be able to perform a task through
more than one role. For example, in Figure ??, t1 is
available through r1 as well as r2. As argued in Sec-
tion 3.2, it is important to motivate users towards us-
ing cheaper roles to perform their tasks. For instance,
administrators should use their root account only when
they cannot perform their tasks through their low priv-
ilege employee account. To achieve this we use the
weight of a role as a multiplier for the task that is be-
ing accessed through the role. Note however, since each
task has already contributed to the weight of a role (eq.
5), multiplying or summing the role’s weight (max
W
[r])
by the task’s cost (max
C
[t]) double counts the cost of the
task. To make this clear, consider a role that has only
one task, for instance in Figure ??, using t2 through r3.
If simple multiplication (or addition) is used to derive
the roles weight, the task would cost [100 or ([20) even
though the weight of r3 is driven directly from t2. The
following equation addresses this by ensuring the cost
of a task is increased only by the proportion of the cost
of other tasks that are associated with the role:
max
C
[t, r] =
 maxW [r]max
C
[t] + 
− 1
 + maxC [t]
s.t. (t, r) ∈ P,  > 0.
(7)
Intuitively the max
C
[t, r] is the cost of executing a task
t through the role r, where  is a negligible non-zero
constant to ensure the validity of the operation if the cost
of the task is zero. Hence, when a task can be performed
through more than one role, the roles can be compared
in terms of their effect on the cost of the task. For ex-
ample, given eq. 7 and Figure ??, executing t2 would be
costlier through r2 (i.e., [11.5) than r3 (i.e., [10).
To show the direct implication of eq. 7 on the tradi-
tional RBAC model, let us introduce the notion of bud-
get with the following characteristics:6
• it is a virtual currency, specific to the organisation,
• it can only be allocated to users by the administra-
tor,
• it is the only means through which users can pay
for tasks,
• it is not transferable from one user to another,
• it cannot be forged, and
• it is valid only for the period for which it is being
allocated (i.e., users’ remaining budget expires at
the end of each budget allocation round).
Given a limited budget to users, all other things be-
ing equal, it follows that the more budget a user has the
more task execution capability they acquire. Hence, all
users regardless of their type or intentions prefer more
budget to less budget. It then follows that when the
only discriminating factor between two roles is their
price, users prefer the cheaper role to perform their
task. Therefore, assuming the inconvenience of chang-
ing roles is negligible, the utility of a role for a user is
inversely proportional to the role’s weight.
This is an important achievement, as it indirectly con-
nects the observance of the principle of least privilege
with users’ utility. Here users’ incentives to perform
their job with least budget consumption is aligned with
the access provider’s incentive to enforce the least priv-
ilege principle (i.e., users use less powerful roles). Fur-
thermore, since the cost of a role is proportional to the
number of its tasks, it follows that for users who are
assigned to roles, unnecessary permissions, or tasks as-
signed to the roles, are no longer considered as “free
permissions”. This is in contrast to current practice
where it is beneficial to users to overestimate the per-
missions they require and demand that administrators
assign as many permissions to the roles as possible
[7, 5]. Here users and administrators have incentives
to cooperate and determine an optimal level of permis-
sions for roles.
6The budget allocation function in the context of RBAC will be
formally introduced in Section 3.6.
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3.4. Escalation Capability
In RBAC users can only execute those tasks that have
been preassigned to them by the administrator (eq. 6).
However, as stated earlier, administrators usually have
incomplete information about users’ access needs and
there may be situations where a user needs to perform
a task they do not have permission for. These situations
if untreated, lead to suboptimal access decisions (i.e.
under-entitlement). Of course manual update of user-
role assignments is possible, however, it is inefficient,
particularly in time-critical emergency situations [10].
Furthermore, in many circumstances, users require only
a transient access to a role rather than permanent ac-
cess. Research shows that the approaches to satisfy such
needs are ad-hoc and usually motivate administrators to
allocate more access than necessary or forget to remove
the “temporary” assignments [7, 18, 5]. The rest of this
section is dedicated to a formal and systematic treatment
of escalation in RBAC. Formally defined as:
escalate[u, t]→ ∃(t, r) ∈ P ∧ @(u, r) ∈ UA. (8)
Intuitively, escalation is the act of executing a task
through a role that has not already been assigned to the
user. This definition is very general in the sense that
it enables users to theoretically use any of the existing
tasks in the system regardless of their intentions, rang-
ing from situation to stealing documents. This defini-
tion of escalation entails the well known concept of del-
egation, which becomes a special case of escalation, in
which, the user u who is escalating (escalate[u, t]) pos-
sesses a support (e.g., in the form of a delegation certifi-
cate [30]) from another user u′ who is already a member
to the role: (u′, r) ∈ UA where (t, r) ∈ P.
Such a support is in fact a control instrument, used
to determine whether the escalation should be allowed
or not. Our definition of escalation opts for the separa-
tion of the concept from such instruments. In an access
control system where users have to pay through their
limited budget to acquire access to resources, the most
effective control instrument at our disposal is price dis-
crimination that will be introduced in the following sec-
tion.
3.5. Price Discrimination
So far we have only considered a flat pricing of per-
missions, where all users pay the full price of the tasks
they want to access (eq. 7). However, flat pricing has
one important drawback when escalation is introduced
to the model. That is, the users who perform jobs that
involve costly tasks must be allocated a large budget.
These users then pose a great risk as they can esca-
late and acquire any permission that costs less than their
highly elevated budget that has been allocated to them.
For instance, consider a hospital employee who may
need to migrate thousands of patients records to a new
system in a given period. In a model where escalation
is possible, the employee may use the budget allocated
for this task to instead escalate his permission and ac-
cess the financial records of patients. The objective is to
reduce such questionable escalations while still allow-
ing the escalations that may be needed by benevolent
employees to complete their jobs.
We adopt price discrimination7 concept to allow for
variable pricing of permissions by using price multi-
plier, ϕ > 1. Conceptually, introducing the price mul-
tiplier allows an identical permission to be transacted at
different prices for users based on an abstract factor that
we refer to as users likelihood to misuse the acquired
permission.
Although a precise determination of such likelihood
is generally impossible, one plausible criteria is prede-
fined operational needs. In an RBAC system, the RBAC
policy provides the reference point to decide whether
a user “needs” or has “competence” to perform the
task, implicitly defined through user-role-permission re-
lationships. We can therefore use RBAC policy to
charge a base price for task executions (eq. 6) and ele-
vate the price for escalations (eq. 8). Through this treat-
ment, the price a user has to pay is adjusted to reflect
users’ assumed eligibility, based on the RBAC policy.
Formally:
price[t, r] =
 maxC [t, r] i f execute[u, t]max
C
[t, r].ϕ i f escalate[u, t] (9)
Determining the multiplier rate is application specific
and may be very elaborate when taking into account fac-
tors such as the roles a user already possesses and the
relevance of these roles to the role that is being used to
make the escalation possible. For instance, a doctor’s
permission escalation to read the record of a patient’s
parents (to search for potential genetic causes) may be
considered as “relevant”, hence elevated substantially
less than a finance manager who is escalating to perform
7The concept of price discrimination is widely known in the field
of economics and can be seen in everyday transactions. It captures
situations when identical goods or services from a single provider are
transacted at different prices for different consumers. An example re-
lated to our work is from insurance markets, where the same insurance
policy is sold for different prices to customers based on their risk pro-
file, which captures factors such as accident history or age.
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the same task. Furthermore, sometimes escalations may
need to be prohibited or made unattractive for users. An
example of such situations is when two roles r1 and r2
are subject to separation of duty constraint. To enforce
this, when escalation violates this constraint, the cost of
the escalation for employees may be raised to ϕ = ∞
in order to disallow such escalations. Role mining tech-
niques such as [31] that provide quantitative notion of
distance between the roles on the basis of an organisa-
tion’s operational structure may be adopted for deter-
mining the rate of price multiplier.
For example, consider Figure 3 and let u (an intern)
be a member of roles r2 and r3 but not r1. Assume that
given statistics about the number of patients admitted to
the hospital, the number of medical staff, the adminis-
trator knows that a full time intern requires 200 units
of organisation’s access budget ([200) to perform their
tasks within a period of a week. Further let ϕ = 5 to
say that that cost of escalations are five times the nor-
mal price. Given these assumptions, Bob can use the
assigned permissions t2 either 15 times through r2 or 20
times through r3 over the course of a week (using eq.
5 and eq. 9). However, let us assume that Bob wants
to access the task t1, either due to an unexpected legiti-
mate need or to satisfy his curiosity about a patient [32].
Given Bob’s budget and the cost of escalation (eq. 9),
he has enough budget to perform t1, but enacting such
an escalation would exhaust a large portion ([35) of his
budget for the period. We will leave the discussion on
implications and approaches to handling early budget
exhaustion to Section 4.
3.6. Budget Allocation Function
The ability of users to escalate or execute a task, re-
gardless of their intentions, is limited by their available
budget. Therefore, it is clear that the appropriate allo-
cation of budget is a powerful tool for ensuring users’
can escalate their permissions (i.e., addressing under-
entitlement), and also limiting users’ misuse capability
(i.e., addressing over-entitlement). So far we have sim-
ply assumed users are allocated a budget by the admin-
istrator. In this section we will formally introduce how
such a function can be implemented given an existing
RBAC policy.
In general the budget allocated to a user must be equal
to the total cost of the tasks the user is supposed to per-
form for a given period. So the budget is directly related
to the frequency, λ ∈ N, by which the users need to exe-
cute tasks in order to perform their job. In practice λ can
be coarse grained, driven from the role itself and be the
same for all users assigned to the role. Otherwise, when
comprehensive workflow information is available, the
allocation of budget can be user-specific, allowing users
with the same role to vary in terms of the number of
tasks they are entitled to execute. For instance, a med-
ical staff member who works part-time is allocated less
budget than a full-time counterpart. Regardless of the
method and granularity by which λ is determined, the
users’ (u) allocated budget can be formally written as:
B[u] =
∑
(u,r)∈UA
∑
(t,r)∈P
λ.max
C
[t, r], ∀u ∈ U. (10)
As we have established so far, one characteristic of a
usable access control model is its ability to capture the
dynamic nature of the system. This refers to changes
in any factor that is relevant in making access deci-
sions. This may include changes in the characteristics
of the resources (e.g., object classification) or changes
in the need for providing access for performing jobs
(e.g., emergency situations). So far, through introduc-
ing the notion of task cost, which can be dynamically
determined based on any application specific require-
ments and adjusted through escalation price multiplier
component of the proposed access discrimination in-
strument, the proposed model provides a degree of dy-
namism. Formally, using eq. 9 and eq. 10, it can be seen
that the users’ ability to escalate given their budget is in-
versely proportional to ϕ. Hence, users’ access can be
discriminated based on their assumed operational needs
stated in the RBAC policy.
However, one crucial aspect of dynamism relates to
changes in user behaviour which is not explicitly cap-
tured in existing RBAC model. Currently it is assumed
that there exists an external pre-screening mechanism
to determine users’ credentials (i.e., trustworthiness,
roles). Hence, the assignment of a user to a role in-
herently indicates: the user’s operational access needs,
their capability in performing the tasks, and their un-
willingness to misuse the permissions associated with
the role (i.e,. trustworthiness). However, even if we as-
sume the operational needs are accurately stated in the
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policy and remain unchanged, users’ willingness to mis-
use permissions may change. For instance, in [20] we
established that a selfish employee’s decision to misuse
permissions is dependant on their payoff which takes
into account and may change with respect to the value
of the resource as well as the probability and severity of
punishment.
To address this we utilise the existing estimators of
users’ behaviour that may be available to the access con-
trol system in order to dynamically adjust the budget
users will be allocated.8 Let β ∈ [0, 1] denote the proba-
bility that the user is malicious, ignoring the possibility
that β may not be an accurate reflection of the users’ ac-
tual type θ, we propose the dynamic budget function to
be:
B∗[u,β] =
 ∑
(u,r)∈UA
∑
(t,r)∈P
λ.max
C
[t, r]
 (1 − β) , u ∈ U.
(11)
The above budget allocation function explicitly inter-
links the available knowledge about users’ types to the
budget they will be allocated. Given this, regardless of
the initial estimation of users’ required budget to com-
plete tasks, the allocated budget will be automatically
adjusted in proportion to the perceived changes in users’
behaviour as they interact with the access control sys-
tem. For instance, each member of a role (e.g., nurse)
may be allocated a different budget despite the fact that
they are all a member of the same role with same oper-
ational access needs. Furthermore, this approach inter-
nalises the concept of punishment - as evidence regard-
ing a user’s maliciousness increases (β ≈ 1) the user’s
budget approximates to zero (B∗[u,β] ≈ 0).
In some organisations the unpredictability of users’
behaviour may be an artefact of the organisation’s dy-
namic nature. As a result, monitoring and flagging po-
tential misuses based on users departure from normal
behaviour is costly and may be unreliable because of the
complexities pertaining to the definition of “normal” be-
haviour [33]. In such circumstances the users’ allocated
budget is solely based on their assumed operational ac-
cess needs (i.e., β = 0 is considered to be the default
value).
In Section 3.3 it was mentioned that rate of ϕ is influ-
enced by users’ likelihood to misuse escalations based
8Note that, even though users’ type (i.e., θ) is assumed to be strictly
private, the outcome of their actions may be observed through log
history, audit or any real-time monitoring mechanism (e.g., intrusion
detection system). Bishop et al., [33] proposed one such technique for
predicting employee’s potential misbehaviour.
on operational needs that can be deduced from user-role
relationships in an RBAC policy. Note that the users’
misuse probability (β) based on behavioral indicators
can also be used to adjust the price multiplier, ϕ. By
allowing this rate to be positively proportional to β we
can ensure that a user’s budget is adjusted not only at
the time of budget allocation cycle, but also after the
budget is allocated. For example, the price multiplier
of escalation requests by those employees who receive
a job termination notice may increase, preventing them
from extracting patients’ records with their remaining
budget.
4. Security Implications
This section will introduce the primary advantages
of the proposed B-RBAC model. It will discuss in
more detail how the model can assist in addressing
three important risk management concepts, namely, risk
communication, risk transfer and risk control. Further,
it will explain how these concepts along with escala-
tion capability can help in reducing under-entitlement
and over-entitlement problems. The advantages of the
model for facilitating administrative tasks i.e., moni-
toring and detection of employees misuse, is also dis-
cussed.
4.1. Risk Communication
In [22, 23, 20] it is argued that permission misuse can
be categorised based on the intentions behind them. In-
advertent or accidental misuse is attributed to those em-
ployees with incomplete or incorrect information about
the potential risk of their actions for the organisation. It
is also suggested that inadvertent misuse can be reduced
if the potential risk of employees’ actions are effectively
communicated to them. In the B-RBAC model the price
of permissions allows for the explicit communication of
the potential risk of actions. Hence it positively con-
tributes to addressing inadvertent misuse.
As an example, consider a nurse who uses an RBAC-
aware email client to transfer a patient’s records to an
external laboratory. The email can be sent via either
encrypted or unencrypted emails. Without the loss of
generality assume that sending an encrypted email is
less efficient (i.e., abstracting for potential cost of se-
curity). With no information available about the secu-
rity risks associated with each option, the nurse may
choose sending unencrypted records. In contract, the
B-RBAC implementation of the email client explicitly
takes into account the number and the sensitivity of the
attached records and presents the nurse with the price
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for each alternative.9 Now even if we assume the nurse
has unlimited budget and therefore no direct incentive
to choose the cheaper (encrypted) option, simply flag-
ging the potential risks of unencrypted transfer may be
enough to eliminate the inadvertent disclosure of pa-
tients’ records by a benevolent nurse.
4.2. Risk Transfer
Risk communication alone may not provide enough
incentive for self-interested employees, whose deci-
sions are influenced by what maximises their utility.
In [20] we argued that the interaction between the ad-
ministrator (i.e., indirectly the organisation) and the
self-interested employees is a form of risk marketplace
wherein the risk of employees’ actions should be trans-
ferred from the administrator to the employees in order
to effectively influence their behaviour. In general, the
risk transfer could take place by manipulating factors
such as the accuracy of misuse detection mechanisms
and the magnitude of external punishments (rewards)
for undesirable (desirable) actions.
In the context of B-RBAC implementation of the
email client, the mere knowledge of the risk of trans-
ferring patients’ records unencrypted does not directly
affect the decision of a selfish nurse who has an unlim-
ited budget. However, by giving a limited budget to the
nurse, since sending the email unencrypted consumes
more of nurse’s budget, everything else being equal, the
self-interested nurse now is given an incentive to choose
the cheaper encrypted transfer. Essentially, by choosing
the unencrypted option the nurse is paying more for the
increased risk to the hospital - risk arising from an in-
creased likelihood of data breach that patients’ records
are exposed to when sent unencrypted. The nurse’s in-
centive to preserve their budget is due to the tacit as-
sumption that the faster the budget is exhausted, the
higher the likelihood that she/he will be audited and po-
tentially held accountable. Section 4.5 provides a de-
tailed discussion about the relationship between budget
exhaustion and usage monitoring.
4.3. Risk Control
Employees may not only be inadvertent or self-
interested, but malicious. In other words, they may ac-
tively seek to inflict cost to the organisation. Therefore,
9The approach taken for representing the price of permissions or
potential warnings are implementation concerns and outside the scope
of the current paper. The common risk representation mechanism
where a set of colours, red, orange, yellow and green are used to rep-
resent a magnitude of risk is a simple and intuitive implementation
approach.
by definition the price of permissions may not affect
the behaviour of these employees, furthermore they may
not even be deterred by increasing the expected punish-
ment.
Given the email client example, a malicious nurse
may not only try to send the unencrypted email, but if
possible, publicise patients records. In an RBAC imple-
mentation of the client the malicious nurse can access
all the patients’ records available to a role nurse. In con-
trast, with the B-RBAC implementation of the client,
a malicious nurse is bounded by the budget they have
been allocated. The budget is therefore an upper bound
on the aggregate cost that can be imposed by the nurse.
Since budget is allocated individually, it is in fact a es-
timate of the risk the hospital has already decided to
tolerate for the nurse.
4.4. Escalation Handling
By introducing the escalation capability, the B-
RBAC model provides a means to address the under-
entitlement problem. By the same token, it may also be
used by malicious users to acquire unintended permis-
sions. However, the extent to which escalation can be
used is directly controlled through the following mech-
anisms:
1. the aggregate amount of damage that may be in-
curred is restricted by the budget allocated to users.
2. the budget allocation function proposed in Section
3.6 is parameterised by the output of online mon-
itoring mechanisms to adjust the users’ disposable
budget based on their observed behaviour (β).
3. the administrator has additional control over the es-
calations through personalising the escalation rate
(ϕ), which as we discussed, may take into account
the application specific factors such as users’ trust-
worthiness, operational need, and access history.
4.5. Effective Administration
Here we divide the functions that consume an admin-
istrator’s time into two categories. First, the specifica-
tion of (RBAC) security policy, which entails the identi-
fication of users, roles, actions, resources, conditions as
well as the user-role and role-permission assignments.
The second function is audit and misuse detection that
usually requires access log analysis. In practice both
of these administrative functions can consume consid-
erable time. In the following sections we will discuss
how the monitoring and analysis of users’ budget ex-
haustions can provide a uniform mechanism to facilitate
these functions.
11
4.5.1. Policy Maintenance
As we discussed in Section 1 and Section 2, under-
entitlement and over-entitlement problems are common
in practice, primarily because a correct specification and
maintenance of access control policies is difficult and
time-consuming. In an RBAC system, to avoid under-
entitlement, users are usually allocated more permis-
sions than they actually need, while over-entitlements
mostly remain undetected or tolerated in the interests of
efficiency.
Under-entitlement can also occur in a B-RBAC sys-
tem when users budget is exhausted due to administra-
tors incorrect prediction of users’ access requirements
for a given period. However, unlike in RBAC, over-
entitlements are transparent, represented by the employ-
ees remaining budget at the end of a period. Hence, we
envisage through analysis of budget spending patterns,
users’ budget can be quantified with sufficient accuracy
to reflect the actual need. For instance, since budgets are
allocated periodically, the unique characteristics of the
period may influence the quantity of the required bud-
get. As an example, statistics may suggest that doctors
have more patients (and hence need more budget) dur-
ing the months of December and January because less
doctors are available in the hospital and more incidents
occur due to higher number of road accidents.
4.5.2. Misuse Detection
The analysis of users’ budget can also assist in mis-
use detection. Assuming that the administrator of a B-
RBAC system has correctly allocated the budget users
need to complete their tasks for a given period, the ex-
haustion of budget can be an indicator of potential mis-
use of permissions. Also, the ratio of users’ ‘remaining
budget’ to ‘remaining duration’ or an abrupt change to
this ratio may be used to indicate misuse. This allows
a user’s potential misuses to be detected even if they
deliberately avoid exhausting their budget.10 Finally,
since the price multiplier indicates the potential inap-
propriateness of the escalation from the administrator’s
perspective, the scale of the price multiplier can used as
a mechanism to prioritise escalation monitoring, with
larger multipliers receiving greater attention.
The analysis of users’ budget for misuse detection
can also assist in detecting two major types of exter-
nal attacks: impersonation attack and denial of service
attack.
10Note that when the threshold is not common knowledge (private
to administrators), strategic users can no longer abuse the detection
mechanism by spending their budget only up to the threshold to avoid
being detected.
Impersonation Attack An outsider may acquire the
credentials of an employee and access the system.
The consequences of a successful impersonation
attack in a traditional access control model includ-
ing RBAC can be devastating as such attacks are
difficult to detect or prevent. The adversary can
access any and all resources for which the legiti-
mate user held privileges without affecting the ac-
tual user’s access capabilities. This is not the case
in B-RBAC. Even though the attack is still possi-
ble, any access by the attacker is counted against
the user’s budget. Hence, users can detect the re-
duction in their budgets. Even if such detection
does not happen, the consequences of such attacks
are strictly limited by the available budget for the
period.
Denial of Service Attack A malicious insider may try
to prevent other users from accessing resources by
performing a denial of service attack. The type
of DoS attack most relevant to this proposal is
query flooding against databases, where the mali-
cious user sends a large number of select or up-
date queries to a targeted database [34]. Current
techniques to prevent such attacks require com-
prehensive real-time analysis of query log files
and assumptions about normal patterns of access
that suffer from a high incidence of false-positives
[16, 34]. In B-RBAC these attacks will have lit-
tle impact and will be easy to prevent, as a user’s
ability to execute tasks is bounded by their limited
budget. The exhaustion of a user’s budget will lead
to termination of the attack and the possible detec-
tion of the malicious user.
5. Enforcement Considerations
This section will discuss implementation concerns
surrounding the proposed B-RBAC model. We will first
introduce the core characteristics that an access con-
trol system must possess in order to implement the B-
RBAC model. Then the optional features of the B-
RBAC model will be discussed. We take the original
RBAC model [27] as a baseline to study the extra over-
head the adoption of these features can impose on the
administrator or the user in a B-RBAC system.
5.1. Enforcement Sub-Models
There are three core requirements that must be sat-
isfied by an access control system that aims to adopt
the proposed B-RBAC model: First, it must allow for
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Model Transparent Transparent Finite Security Implication
Budget? Cost? ϕ
B-RBAC0 7 7 7 RBAC +
Effective Monitoring and Detection +
Bounded Risk
B-RBAC1 X 7 7 B-RBAC0 +
Risk Transfer
B-RBAC2 7 X 7 B-RBAC0 +
Risk Communication
B-RBAC3 7 7 X B-RBAC0 +
Escalation Handling
Table 1: Enforcement Models
each user to be assigned a mutable attribute budget. Sec-
ond, it must allow for objects to have a mutable attribute
cost associated with them. Third, the users’ acquisi-
tion of permissions must be solely conditional upon the
availability of budget, rather than directly based on the
RBAC security policy.
There are also three optional features. First, the trans-
parency of budget: whether users are informed of the
amount of their budget. Second, the transparency of
cost: whether users are aware of the price of permis-
sions. Third, finiteness of ϕ: whether escalation is al-
lowed, which requires the administrator to explicitly
specify the rate of multiplier on the price of escalation,
rather than imposing an infinite multiplier on all esca-
lations. As shown in Table 1, when the transparency
of both permission prices and users’ budgets, as well as
the finiteness of escalation multipliers are made optional
several implementation sub-models emerge.11
As Table 2 summarises, inclusion of each option in-
troduces an overhead for either the administrator or the
users of the system. The primary overhead for the ad-
ministrator arises from the amount of effort needed to
configure the B-RBAC system. For users, the main
overhead are the decisions about budget expenditure.
Therefore a tradeoff needs to be made between the capa-
bility of the model and these overheads. In the follow-
ing section we will analyse B-RBAC sub-models with
respect to these overheads.
5.1.1. B-RBAC0
As shown in Table 1, B-RBAC0 is the closest to
RBAC. The infinite tax on escalations means that the
model is at least as strict as the RBAC model. This
means, users can only access those permission sets that
have been pre-assigned to them by the administrator
through user-role and role-task associations.
11Note that even though there are 8 sub-models, sub-models B-
RBAC4 to B-RBAC7 are not discussed as they are simply the hybrid
implementation of B-RBAC0 to B-RBAC3.
In comparison to RBAC, B-RBAC0 increases the ef-
fort (time) that the administrator needs to invest in im-
plementing the policy as each task must be explicitly
assigned a cost (max
C
[t]). Furthermore, for the budget
allocation function to calculate users’ budgets, it must
also be provided with the task execution frequency (λ).-
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B-RBAC0 can also assist administration in two ma-
jor aspects. It facilitates misuse detection through the
monitoring of users’ budget. This is because the price
of permissions and budget are still used for making ac-
cess decisions, even though the are not transparent to
users. Furthermore, users’ limited budget still ensures
that there is an upper-bound on the risk they can expose
the system to. However, since permission prices and
users’ budget are not transparent, it can neither support
risk communication, nor does it support risk transfer.
5.1.2. B-RBAC1
The administrative overhead of B-RBAC1 and B-
RBAC0 are equal. But, users’ overhead increases in
B-RBAC1. This is because budget transparency means
users are faced with a decision as to whether to perform
tasks or retain their budget. As shown in Table 1, in B-
RBAC1 users can not determine the cost of resources in
advance. This implementation may be suitable for sce-
narios where the cost of a permission in itself may reveal
some information about the importance of the resource.
This revelation may in turn influence some users to ac-
cess these resources out of curiosity. For example, in
a hospital scenario where the cost of a patient’s record
has a correlation with their fame, transparent cost of re-
sources may trigger curiosity in hospital staff. The scan-
dal surrounding Nadya Suleman’s case [32] is a real life
12Note that λ can also be determined indirectly with less adminis-
trative cost: the administrator can allocate a very large budget to users
and observe how much budget is left-over after each period. By ob-
serving these budget leftovers, the administrator can acquire a more
accurate knowledge about users’ budget need.
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Model User Invovement Cost Administrative Cost
B-RBAC0 = RBAC > RBAC
B-RBAC1 > B-RBAC0 = B-RBAC0
B-RBAC2 > B-RBAC0 = B-RBAC0
B-RBAC3 = B-RBAC0 > B-RBAC0
Table 2: Enforcement Models: User and Administrative Cost
example of curiosity driven misuse of permissions in a
hospital.
5.1.3. B-RBAC2
In B-RBAC2 the users’ budgets are not transparent.
This captures implementations where users are not ex-
plicitly told that their access to resources is metered
against their limited budget. Hence, the overhead for
users from budget expenditure decisions is eliminated.
In B-RBAC2, the transparency of the cost of permis-
sions can communicate the potential sensitivity of the
resources and provide the information required to curb
some of the inadvertent misuse discussed in Section 4.1.
With regard to administrative cost, both B-RBAC1 and
B-RBAC2 are equal to B-RBAC0.
5.1.4. B-RBAC3
B-RBAC3 can be considered as RBAC with escala-
tion. It enables users to acquire the permissions that
have not been preassigned to them, given the user has
enough budget. Since neither the quantity of budget nor
the cost of permissions is transparent there is no over-
head on users. In fact, they may not be aware that they
have been allocated a limited budget or that their access
to resources is metered against their budget. Since B-
RBAC3 provides an escalation capability, the escalation
multiplier needs to be customised based on the roles, or
users’ attributes depending on the granularity required
by the application. Therefore the administrative over-
head of B-RBAC3 is more than B-RBAC0, B-RBAC1
and B-RBAC2. However, B-RBAC3 can also reduce
administrative overhead: monitoring of users’ budget
enables administrator(s) to update their knowledge of
users permission needs. For instance when no permis-
sion misuse is detected but a user’s budget is exhausted
before the designated period, this may flag to the admin-
istrator that insufficient budget has been allocated to the
user. Furthermore, users’ budget monitoring can also
detect users’ potential misuse of assigned permissions
and escalations. Hence, the effort that the administrator
needs to exert on audit is reduced.
6. Discussion of Future Works
We have identified three immediate areas for future
work: First, perform an empirical study of the proposed
model. Second, implementation of the B-RBAC on ex-
isting databases. Third, study the suitability of the B-
RBAC model to enforce obligation policies.
6.1. Empirical Study
The B-RBAC model proposed in this paper provides
a unified framework to address under-entitlement and
over-entitlement. In the context of RBAC this means,
when alternative roles exist to perform a task, users
are given incentives to choose to activate cheaper roles,
execute cheaper tasks or prefer to perform their jobs
through their assigned permissions over escalations.
However, it is not currently clear to what extent and un-
der what conditions users’ choices would actually be
influenced through the allocation of a limited budget
and price discrimination between tasks. Also, it is un-
clear how users will react to the extra tradeoff analysis
they are faced with. More specifically, does the intro-
duction of pay for access induce some users to refrain
from accessing resources, hence reducing productivity?
This behaviour may be due to users’ fear that before the
period lapses, they may need budget to perform other
tasks. Furthermore, is it possible that the proposed B-
RBAC model encourages some users to go on a spend-
ing spree to ensure their budget is consumed before the
end of the budget allocation cycle?
In order to test the hypothesis that the B-RBAC
model is effective in reducing under-entitlement and
over-entitlement in a practical setting, an empirical eval-
uation of the model is needed.
6.2. Implementation
There are two main concerns regarding the practi-
cality of implementing the B-RBAC model in a real
world setting for conducting a field study. First, can
the proposed model be adopted by an existing access
control system? To this end, we conjecture that imple-
menting the model as a proxy to an existing relational
database is a logical starting point. There are three pri-
mary reasons for this. First, the B-RBAC model is based
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on the standard RBAC model currently implemented
in some relational database management systems [35]
(e.g., Informix, Sybase and Oracle). Second, relational
databases are widely used in healthcare. Third, the in-
formation stored in databases is structured and the oper-
ations that can be performed on the information are well
defined. For example, in the simplest form all the cells
in a database could be assigned a uniform cost and the
cost of a SELECT query would be based on the number
of cells it returns.
Second, how practical is the configuration of the pro-
posed model for the administrator? It has been assumed
that the administrator can determine the cost of tasks
and the usage frequency of these tasks. Although in en-
vironments where resources are structured, operations
are well defined and the number of roles are limited this
assumption may hold, the extent of administrative over-
head introduced needs to be evaluated in more general
settings.
6.3. Obligation Enforcement
In general, obligation policies comprise those actions
that should be performed by the user at some time in
the future. For example, an obligation in a hospital may
state that staff should terminate the application sessions
they use to access patients’ records when their task is
completed. The existing access control models [36, 37]
that support obligations assume that the criteria (e.g.,
time-frame, situation) for performing obligations can be
predefined and their fulfilment is enforceable [38]. This
assumption may not always hold. For example, it may
not be practical to predict when a staff member has to
close an application session when providing care for a
patient. Further, automatically disabling the session af-
ter a predefined period of inactivity may interfere with
the provision of care.
We consider the fulfilment of obligations by users to
be an incentive problem. The question is how to struc-
ture incentives that motivate the user to honour the obli-
gations. Given the B-RBAC model proposed in this pa-
per, one approach is to assign cost to obligations in a
similar fashion to the assignment of cost to permissions.
The price of unfulfilled obligations are then charged to
user’s available budget. When obligations are honoured,
the cost of the obligation is credited back to the user’s
budget. In this way, users are provided with incentives
to fulfil their obligations while providing the flexibility
for users to decide when to do so. We conjecture this is a
novel approach to the enforcement of obligations, how-
ever further study is needed to determine the suitability
of the B-RBAC model for enforcing obligations.
7. Conclusion
This paper proposed a novel Budget-aware Role
Based Access Control model (B-RBAC) where instead
of making access decisions based on constructs such as
roles, the access decision is based on whether the user
can afford the cost of the permission. It was shown how
an RBAC policy can be employed as a reference point
to discriminate between users to individualise permis-
sion costs and to allocate budget to users. The proposed
approach enforces an explicit upper-bound on poten-
tial damage by users regardless of their assigned roles;
it allows users to gain unassigned permissions; it pro-
motes the alignment of users’ incentives to observe the
principle of least privilege, and integrates a monitoring
and misuse detection mechanism into the access control
model. The combination of these characteristics con-
tributes to the optimality of access control decisions. Fi-
nally, the proposed model was analysed in terms of the
potential overhead that its implementation can impose
on the administrator or the users. Moreover, four pri-
mary sub-models were introduced to allow for the par-
tial adoption of the model.
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